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In the Light of the Crimean Crisis will International Law have to 
accept that it is to the Advantage of the Citizens of Crimea that, in this 
Case, the Law of State Succession applies De Facto in Preference to 
that of Occupied Territory Law? 
A Introduction
Between 21 November 2013 and 18 March 2014 Crimea underwent a crisis of 
independence, from a self-declared independent state to an entity of Russia. This 
has in turn led to a crisis in international law.
The Peninsula of Crimea is situated on the northern shore of the Black Sea and it
is contiguous with the territory of Ukraine. To the east of the peninsula the narrow 
Kerch Strait separates Crimea from mainland Russia – its only other near 
neighbour. Despite a relatively small extent of approximately 27 000 km² and 
having a population of 2,35 million, Crimea has continued to occupy a prominent 
place in history. In the current decade the incidents in Crimea represent a major 
crisis of our time. The crisis has led not only to geographical and political 
changes; it has also had a profound effect from the perspective of international 
law. 
Tsarina Catherine II conquered Crimea from the Ottoman Empire in 1783 and 
until 1954 the peninsula was an integral part of Russia. Following a decision of 
the Supreme Soviet in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev awarded the peninsula to 
Ukraine. After the independence of the Ukraine in 1991, Crimea remained part of 
the territory of the new republic. In 1992, however, it gained the status of an 
autonomous republic with Simferopol as its administrative capital. Since 1996, the 
Republic of Crimea has had its own constitution, parliament and government as 
well as enjoying additional further autonomous rights. But Russian influence in 
Crimea did not end after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. This continuing 
influence is illustrated by the fact that since 1997 Ukraine has contractually 
prescribed that the Russian Federation’s navy be allowed to deploy her Black Sea 
Fleet at the Port of Sevastopol.
Not only has the past history of the peninsula contributed to the current crisis, its
geographical position and social situation are also major contributory factors. 
Because Crimea lies at the edge of the Russian Federation, it marks not only a 
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geographical border but also a limit of political and social understanding. 
Moreover, it can be seen as the watershed between West and East. This interface 
is indicated especially by the ethnic mixture of the peninsula’s population: 60% of 
the inhabitants are Russians, 25% Ukrainians and 12% Tartars. These factors
demonstrate the overwhelming economic and political influence of Russia in this 
region, which then came to a head with the “annexation of Crimea” by Russia in 
2014.
This conflict has brought about the most serious post-Cold War security crisis 
between Russia and the West to date.1 The real threat is that President Vladimir 
Putin could continue to translate his nostalgia for the old Soviet Union into action. 
While policymakers in the United States and Russia have cautioned against 
drawing Cold War parallels, numerous analysts in both countries have proclaimed 
the start of a new Cold War in light of the resulting rapid deterioration in relations 
between Moscow and Washington.2
Ukraine has also assumed greater importance due to geo-strategic interests. The 
country is torn between the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and Russia,
on the other. For the EU, Ukraine represents a potential candidate for future 
inclusion, whereas for Russia it represents a bulwark against further Western 
influence. The concept of “near-abroad” – an extraterritorial sphere of influence
that includes Eastern European states where Moscow considers itself entitled to 
interfere – is still upheld by Russia; this means that the neutrality of any 
remaining states in this sphere is insisted upon by Russia, effectively denying 
them the ability to ally themselves with Western entities.3 In the past years 
Ukraine also appeared to lean more and more towards the EU. The Ukraine 
government discussed the possibility of the country becoming part of the EU at 
great length. Russia regarded this potential expansion of the EU right up to its 
borders as an unacceptable threat to Russian security. For this reason, the concept 
of “near-abroad” became increasingly important.
                                               
1 R Geiss. 2015. Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind slowly but 
they do Grind. International Law Studies 91: 426.
2 BN Mamlyuk. 2015. The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II and International Law. German Law 
Journal 16(3): fn 80. 
3 N Davies. 2012. Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-forgotten Europe. London: Penguin 
Books, 695; C Marxsen. 2014. The Crimea Crisis – An International Law Perspective. Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 74: 367.
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The roots of the crisis are multi-dimensional and may even be considered to
include – among other things – the ongoing friction caused by Russia’s granting 
of asylum to WikiLeaks fugitive, Edward Snowden, and its support for Bashar al-
Assad in the civil war in Syria. Add to this the centuries-old rivalry between 
Ukraine and Russia and the Russian view of Ukraine as the origin of their 
language and statehood, and Russia’s fatally assuming that they represent the 
same people. Another important factor is that the crisis cannot be understood 
without analysing purely socio-economic conditions and the debate over regional 
trade integration. 
The influence of the crisis in Crimea at an international level should also not be 
underestimated. The crisis produced vehement political discussions which placed 
the question of international law at the focus of the public domain. The legal 
problems which were caused and discussed during the crisis are set out in this
dissertation. Furthermore, this dissertation aims to identify the legal consequences
of the crisis which do not currently form a major part of the legal discussion. 
In the first part of the thesis, I give a historic overview of the events which took
place at the beginning of 2014. This is followed by the examination of the legal 
status of Crimea which under international law is currently controversial and 
dependent upon one’s point of view. The question is: Is Crimea part of Russia or
is it still Ukrainian territory, or what other status could it have? Only after 
answering this question is it possible to examine the legal consequences of the 
crisis and the legal problems which were caused. The focus is on the citizenship 
and rights of the inhabitants of Crimea.
Surprisingly, the articulation of various economic and political claims in narrow 
international legal terms rapidly catapults an otherwise purely domestic matter 
into the realm of international law, provided various international legal actors are 
prepared to entertain those claims or honour various interests. 
What has to be examined is whether the traditional international law instruments
are still applicable.4 A further challenge to have arisen in recent years reached its
first climax in the Crimea crisis in the form of the return of renewed East–West 
conflict, which can influence the international law.
                                               
4 P Hilpold. 2015. Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with 
Arguments Drawn from History. Chinese Journal of International Law 14(2): 1. 
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B A Historical Overview of the Events of Early 2014
On 21 November 2013, Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovych decided not to 
sign the association agreement with the EU. The reasons given for his decision 
were to take note of national interests and the need to improve Ukraine’s 
relationship with Russia and the Community of Independent States.5 In its place, 
the president signed a treaty and a multi-billion dollar loan agreement with Russia. 
These actions by Yanukovych triggered country-wide street protests led by the 
“Euromaidan” protest movement. Attempts at using the police force to stem the 
protests only fanned the flames. On 21 February 2014, Yanukovych and 
representatives of the opposition – with the assistance of the Secretaries of State
of Germany, France and Poland – signed an agreement to settle the crisis in 
Ukraine. The key points of the agreement were:
 within ten days a government of national unity should be formed to begin 
working on constitutional reforms;
 early presidential elections should be held, and
 acts of violence on both sides should be clarified.
However, this agreement did not satisfy the protesters and they continued to 
demand Yanukovych’s resignation. After signing the agreement and fearing the 
protesters’ revenge, Yanukovych fled Kiev for Russia. As a result of his flight and 
his inability to perform his function, the Ukraine Parliament by constitutional 
majority on 22 February 2014 declared the president deposed. A new government
led by interim president Andresij Jazenjuk was formed and police and military 
forces were withdrawn. The new government was broadly inclusive of the 
political forces in Ukraine which sought a “European” orientation for the country 
while at the same time rejecting closer economic and political integration with 
Russia;6 national elements were also represented.7 During the protests 
approximately 100 peaceful demonstrators had been killed and thousands injured 
by armed police and military forces.8  
                                               
5 V Motyl. 2015. Annexion der Krim und Anwendung militärischer Gewalt durch Russland gegen 
die Ukraine: Gibt es eine völkerrechtliche Rechtfertigung dafür? Zeitschrift für Aussen und 
Sicherheitspolitik 8(3): 316. 
6 PM Olson. 2014. The Lawfulness of Russian Use of Force in Crimea. Military Law and the Law 
of War Review 53(1): 19. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Motyl (note 5) 316. 
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A few days later, on 27 February 2014, the parliament in Simferopol, the 
administrative capital of Crimea, was occupied by heavily armed persons and the 
Russian flag was hoisted. Simultaneously, airports and military facilities were 
occupied by “Little Green Men” – a phrase used by both Russian and Ukrainian 
reporters which refers to both the colour of their uniforms and their unconfirmed 
origin. These troops forced Ukrainian military units to surrender and withdraw 
from the peninsula.9 They characterised themselves as indigenous Crimean “self-
defence” forces but were using vehicles with Russian military plates and wearing 
green Russian military uniforms without any identifying markings.10 Russian 
President Vladimir Putin also denied that Russian military forces were involved. 
Only on 1 March did he ask the Upper House of the Russian Parliament for 
permission to use military forces in order to protect the Russian citizens in Crimea 
until the situation had stabilised.11 However, on 16 April 2014, Putin finally 
admitted the involvement of Russian military forces in a television interview.
Justification for the actions was, on the one hand, the adoption of legislation by 
the Ukrainian Parliament which rejected the use of Russian language and, on the
other, the number of incidents of violence against Yanukovych’s supporters.12
On 11 March the Crimean Parliament declared the independence of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and on 16 March it held a referendum on the 
matter of its affiliation to the Russian Federation. Following the declaration of 
independence, Russian troops openly took part in action in Crimea, demanding
the surrender of any remaining Ukrainian military units and forcing them to 
vacate the peninsula.13 By a large majority, the Crimean people voted in the 
referendum in favour of affiliation to the Russian Federation. 
After the Russian Council of the Federation had approved Crimea’s request to join
and recognised the Republic of Crimea as a state, on 18 March 2014 Russia and 
Crimea signed the Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the 
Russian Federation.
                                               
9 Marxsen (note 3) 369.
10 Olson (note 6) 20.
11 ITAR-TASS Press Report: Putin’s letter on use of Russian Army in Ukraine goes to Upper 
House, 1 March 2014.
12 Olson (note 6) 19.
13 Marxsen (note 3) 369.
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These acts carried out by Crimea and Russia elicited an immediate response from 
Western states. On 12 March 2014, leaders of the G7, along with the President of 
the European Council and the President of the European Commission, issued a 
statement in which they demanded that the Russian Federation cease all efforts to 
change the status of Crimea contrary to Ukrainian legislation and international 
law.14 On 15 March 2015 the United States attempted to sanction the Russian
behaviour in the UN Security Council, but the attempt failed due to Russia’s veto. 
Also on 18 March 2014, the President of the European Council and the President 
of the European Commission announced that the EU would neither recognise the 
referendum nor any acts that followed it. After the attempt at sanctioning Russia 
in the Security Council had failed, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
Resolution on 27 March 2014 – by a vote of 100 in favour, 11 against and 58 
abstentions – declaring the referendum illegal: 
The referendum in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol 
on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of 
the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city Sevastopol.1516
In addition, since this time several Western states have imposed restrictive 
measures against Russia and Crimea, for example, asset freezes and visa bans.
C Legal Status of Crimea under International Law
The crisis in Crimea has created new challenges for international law. At this 
stage there is confusion over the legal status of the peninsula under international 
law. On the one hand, Russia considers the area as part of the Russian Federation
and the citizens of Crimea have become Russian citizens with Russian passports
and the Russian rouble is now the only valid currency. On the other hand, the 
Ukrainian government claims that Crimea was unlawfully annexed by Russia and 
therefore still forms part of Ukraine. 
In the following section the status of Crimea under international law is examined. 
Part of the examination analyses the actions which took place on the road to the 
                                               
14 O Zadorozhny. 2014. Comparative Characteristics of the Crimea and Kosovo Cases: 
International Law Analysis. European Political and Law Discourse 1(3): 6. 
15 United Nations General Assembly. 27 March 2014. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine – UN Doc
RES/68/262 v 27.
16 Motyl (note 5) 317.
7
“annexation”. The section examines the use of force in Crimea, the referendum, 
the declaration of independence and the Treaty on the Accession of the Republic 
of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Apart from analysing the different steps
taken, several justifications by Russia of her actions have to be examined from the 
perspective of international law.
1. Legal Foundations
In order to evaluate the behaviour of Russia and actions of the Crimean population 
under international law, which took place after the overthrow of Yanukovych, it is 
important to examine the major principle and treaties of international law in this 
regard.
The principle that has to be mentioned is the prohibition of the use of force against 
another state. This principle is expressed by art 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945): 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against another the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.
The principle was intended to outlaw war in its classic sense, that is, the use of 
military force to acquire territory or other benefits from another state.17 The article 
is controversial – if it is to be interpreted in its widest sense – as it would then 
embrace all types of coercion, for example, including economic and political
pressure. Despite various interpretations of these problems (which are 
unimportant to our present case), it has to be noted that not every military action 
constitutes a use of force. Actions which take place with authorisation and within
the scope of this authorisation are normally excluded, because the state would 
have exercised its sovereignty.18 Moreover, the use of force is not prohibited if the 
state has the right of self-defence. However, self-defence is legal only if the 
requirements of art 51 of the UN Charter are met. The UN Charter acknowledges
the right of self-defence as an inherent right of states against armed attacks.19 The 
UN Charter prohibition on the unilateral use of force and its exception in the case 
                                               
17 LF Damrosch, L Henkin, SD Murphy & H Smit. 2009. International Law (American Casebook 




of self-defence against an armed attack are regarded as part of customary 
international law and have the status of jus cogens.20
In addition to the principle of prohibition on the use of force, bi-lateral agreements
such as the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 are relevant. The Budapest 
Memorandum was concluded to provide Ukraine security assurances for acceding 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.21 In exchange for 
Ukraine’s giving up its nuclear arsenal, the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Russia committed to “respect the Independence and sovereignty and the 
existing borders of Ukraine” and reaffirmed 
their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will 
ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.22
A second important agreement is the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Partnership between Ukraine and Russia. This agreement again guaranteed the 
inviolability of the borders between the two states and provided that both parties
shall build their mutual relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect 
for their sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, peaceful 
resolution of disputes, non-use of force, including economic and other means of 
pressure, the right of peoples to freely determine their fate, non-interference in 
internal affairs, observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
cooperation among states, the conscientious performance of international 
obligations undertaken, and generally recognized norms of international law.23
In 1997, Russia and Ukraine also signed a treaty granting Russia the use of
Sevastopol as a base for its Black Sea Fleet; this in return obliged Russia’s forces 
present under the terms of the treaty to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, observe its 
legislation and refrain from interfering in the country’s internal affairs.24
                                               
20 D Kretzmer. 2013. The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality. Jus ad Bellum. The 
European Journal of International Law 24 (1): 241.
21 Marxsen (note 3) 370.
22 Ibid; Budapest Memorandum, signed 5 December 1994.
23 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, 
signed 31 May 1997, art 3.
24 Olson (note 6) 26; Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, Kiev, 
signed 27 May 1997. This treaty of 28 May 1997 between Russia and Ukraine established two 
independent national fleets and divided armaments and bases between them. Available at 
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a360381.pdf (accessed 20 October 2015). 
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2. The Events in Crimea from the Perspective of International Law
Based on legal foundations, in the following we have a closer look at the actions 
which took place in Crimea and resulted in the inclusion of Crimea into the 
Russian Federation. It has to be examined if Russia’s justifications are consistent
with the international law and what Crimea’s status under international law is, if 
the inclusion was unlawful.
(a) Use of Force by Russia in Crimea
Days after the overthrow of Yanukovych, “Little Green Men” arrived in Crimea 
and occupied the Crimean parliament and several military bases. They called 
themselves “self-defence groups”. They did not display Russian military insignia, 
but were equipped with Russian military vehicles and equipment.25 Putin denied 
any involvement of Russian soldiers and no definite proof was given at this point.
Despite any actual operations of Russian soldiers in Crimea there is proof that 
these paramilitary forces were – in the beginning – primarily logistical supported
and after a few days were provided with equipment and operated in a way that 
they are supported by strong military power.26 No shots were fired; however, the 
UN Charter prohibits equally the threat of the use of force as well as its actual
use. By occupying and pressuring the Ukrainian military facilities and forcing its
soldiers to leave the peninsula, art 2(4) of the UN Charter could have be violated, 
if the actions of these groups can be attributed to Russia. In order to attribute such 
a group to an outside state the International Court of Justice (ICJ) applies the 
“effective control” test. The ICJ developed the effective control test in the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua case)27 to determine if the United States were responsible for actions 
of the contras in Nicaragua.28 The test was questioned in case Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadic (Tadic case),29 where the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) used the overall control test, but is since 2007 the applicable 
test is the “effective control” test, because the ICJ confirmed the effective control 
test in the Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
                                               
25 Hilpold (note 4) 15.
26 Ibid.
27 ICJ. 27 June 1986. (Nicaragua v United States of America) Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits).
28 ICJ (note 27) para 115.
29 ITCY 15 July 1999. Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic IT95-1-A.
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide case).3031 At this stage, neither of 
these two tests can be considered as customary international law. The difference is 
that the overall control test was used in the Tadic case to determine whether an
armed conflict has an international character. Because the ICJ has already decided 
a case with regard to state responsibility by using the “effective control” test, this 
test will be used to determine whether Russia can be held responsible for the 
action committed by the “Little Green Men”. The Court determined that to 
attribute actions of paramilitary groups to a state, a relationship of complete 
dependence has to be found, which means that financing, training and support is 
not enough; there have to be specific instructions and planning by the state.32 The 
way in which the “Little Green Men” were operating and the manner in which 
they were equipped presupposes that the bulk of these troops were supported by a 
strong military power, particularly since the coordinated actions of these forces
led to the assumption that they acted under the direct control of Russia.33
Furthermore, President Vladimir Putin admitted in an interview to an involvement 
of Russian soldiers, which indicates that Russia planned and directed the actions 
in Crimea. It can therefore be concluded that Russian soldiers acted in Crimea, 
Russia still violated art 2(4) of the UN Charter and therefore violated international 
law, as long as no justifications can be found. The intervention through the use of 
force also violated multilateral agreements, for example, Russia contravened the 
Budapest Memorandum and the Treaty of Friendship. In the following section, the 
justifications for the use of force are examined. Russia put forward these 
justifications and, if these are acceptable under international law, Putin’s speech 
of 18 March 2014 gives the most comprehensive view of Russia’s justifications. 
Putin does not just present legal arguments; he often makes political statements, 
which should indicate a legal background.
Russia justified the use of force in Crimea by citing her concern for the physical 
safety of Russian nationals in Ukraine. This concern was not entirely baseless, as
                                               
30 ICJ. 26 February 2007. (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case, 
para 400.
31 Hilpold (note 4) 18.
32 ICJ (note 28) at para 115; RJ Goldstone & RJ Hamilton. 2008. Bosnia v Serbia: Lessons from 
the Encounter of the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. Leiden Journal of International Law 21: 98.
33 J Kranz. 2004. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Sovreign Democracy: Some Remarks on the 
Annextion of Crimea by Russia. Archiv des Völkerrechts 52(June): 213.
11
over the weeks of crisis several violent incidents were directed against Russian
nationals. In normal circumstances a host state is responsible for preserving public 
order and protecting foreign nationals from violations. However, under certain 
conditions some scholars and state practices accept interventions in a foreign state 
under international law for the purposes of rescuing nationals.34 Even this matter, 
however, is controversial and there are two grounds on which the protection of 
nationals can be seen as a principle of international law: first, the rescue of 
nationals is usually undertaken for a limited period and therefore constitutes a
minor infringement of art 2(4) of the UN Charter.35 The purpose of the 
intervention is designed neither to destabilise the foreign government nor to 
undermine its sovereignty. Secondly, the protection of nationals can be seen as a 
part of the right of self-defence and is covered by the scope of art 51 of the UN 
Charter.36 Therefore the protection of nationals can be seen as an autonomous 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force which is tolerated by the states.37
But in such a case three conditions for the use of force are required: first, that 
nationals are victims of grave human rights violations or an imminent threat of 
injury is present.38 Secondly, that local government, who are responsible for 
maintaining civil order and protecting minorities, have proved unable or unwilling 
to do so.39 Thirdly, the measures are limited to the necessity of ensuring the safety
of civilians, which means they are often short term and limited in scope. If this 
requirement is applied to the case of Crimea, one has to conclude that this did not 
apply here. No incidents were reported where Russians had to face grave physical 
or human rights violations. Although there was confusion in the government, the 
situation was far from a breakdown as the Ukrainian authorities still had the 
power to protect foreign nationals. Therefore the preconditions were not fulfilled 
and the use of force could not be justified by invoking the principle of the 
protection of nationals.
Furthermore, the Russian authorities pronounced the principle of invitation to 
intervene as a justification. During the Security Council debate about Crimea, the 
                                               
34 Motyl (note 5) 370; Olson (note 6) 35.
35 TW Bennett & J Strug. 2013. Introduction to International Law. Cape Town: Juta, 342.
36 Ibid. 
37 N Ronzitti. 1985. Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff; Hilpold (note 4) fn 53. 
38 Motyl (note 5) 4.
39 Olson (note 6) 35.
12
Russian representatives presented a letter addressed by the former Ukrainian
president Yanukovych in which he requested Russian use of force to establish 
peace and order in the defence of the people of Ukraine.40 The principle of 
intervention by invitation is not inconsistent with the international law. This 
principle allows a foreign state to deploy troops within the borders of another 
state;41 however, as an exception to art 2(4) of the UN Charter, it faces limitations. 
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ concluded that the government had the right to ask 
for such intervention.42 What is controversial is whether Yanukovych was still the 
legitimate head of government at the time of the invitation: his legitimacy is 
questionable because he had fled and had been removed from office by the 
Ukrainian parliament. But we have to consider that his removal was not in 
compliance with the Ukrainian Constitution; for this reason he still could be in a
position to request help from Russia. In principle, the consent needs to be 
expressed by the state’s highest authorities, which is generally the internationally 
recognised government.43 Problems in this regard occur in times of civil war and 
revolutionary movements, because different states recognise different parties to 
the conflict as the legitimate government. By tradition, the criterion of effective 
control over at least parts of the state’s territory is used to indicate the
representing authorities.44 But this criterion has been questioned in the past 
decade, because it displays certain weaknesses – for example: Is a brief loss of 
control already a loss of effective control?45 This is why scholars argue that the 
question of the legitimate government should be answered through the criterion of 
legitimacy. State practice is inconsistent in this case.46 In the case of Ukraine,
Yanukovych lost effective control when he fled to Russia and, even if one refers 
to the criterion related to the legitimacy of government, no evidence exists that he
had a stronger claim to legitimacy than the established interim government,47 as 
he did not enjoy majority support. To expect that international order would 
                                               
40 UN DOC S/PV.7125, 3 March 2014. Available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
documents/document/spv7125-1.php (accessed 8 September 2015).
41 Olson (note 6) 31.
42 ICJ (note 28) at para 260.
43 Marxsen (note 3) 374.
44 G Nolte. 2010. Intervention by Invitation. In R Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law Online. Available at www.mpil.de/en/.../public-international-law/max-
planck-encyclopedia.cf (accessed 14 September 2015).
45 Marxsen (note 3) 375.
46 Hipold (note 4) 23.
47 Marxsen (note 3) 376.
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provide for sanctions in case of such a formal constitutional violation would mean 
to largely overstate the possibilities of international law.48 Consequently, the 
invitation from Yanukovych can be seen as invalid, which means that that the 
principle of intervention by invitation was no justification for the use of force by 
Russia.
Russia also attempted to justify its actions under the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention as it claimed to have the responsibility to protect not only Russian 
nationals but also ethnic Russians as well as other citizens. There is no definite 
right in international law which recognises the responsibility to protect a person 
on the grounds of ethnic background.49 It is controversial whether the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention is applicable in such a situation. This doctrine, under 
which a humanitarian crisis of extreme gravity may provide a lawful basis for 
international armed intervention, has gained only limited support among states.50
The requirements for a lawful humanitarian intervention are similar to those 
justifying the use of force to protect nationals. As already analysed above, the 
preconditions were not met for any Russian intervention. Consequently, Russia 
had no right to use force in Crimea.
The presence of Russian troops also violated several treaties. However, there
could have been justification if the presence of Russian soldiers had been
consistent with the Treaty of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian authorities have 
asserted that during the whole crisis their military presence was below the agreed 
25 000 troop level. But Russia did not just agree to a limitation of troops: the 
Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) also restricted the permissible locations of 
Russian forces in Crimea and the equipment that they could possess.51 In addition,
the treaty required that Russia give notice and wait for approval from the 
Ukrainian authorities if they wished to move outside the permissible locations. 
The latter terms of the treaty were violated by Russia during the crisis as Russian 
soldiers entered government buildings and Ukrainian military facilities – the 
Ukrainian government having given no such approval.
                                               
48 Hilpold (note 4) 23.
49 Olson (note 6) 37.
50 Ibid.
51 Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, Kiev, signed 27 May 1997.
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Besides these justifications, Russia finally put forward the principle of rebus sic 
stantibus and state succession in order to justify its breaches of treaties.52 Russian 
actions stood in contrast to the Budapest Memorandum, the Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation and SOFA. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus means that legal 
agreements are no longer binding due to fundamental changes of circumstances.53
This principle is codified in art 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969). In connection with state succession, the principle of “clean state 
doctrine” exists, which means that a new state does not take over the positions in a 
contract of the former state.54 Putin argued that such circumstances existed in 
Ukraine. He considered that a change of the identity of the Ukrainian state had 
taken place. Putin also argued that post-revolutionary Ukraine was no longer the 
identical subject to the pre-revolutionary one to which Russia was treaty-bound to 
respect borders and therefore the principle of “clean state doctrine” applied and 
represented a fundamental change of circumstances. 
But this assumption fails in two ways: first, the requirements of state succession 
do not apply because revolutionary regime changes have no influence on the 
identity of the state.55 Secondly, Putin misunderstands art 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 62 does not provide a right to 
terminate a treaty by appealing to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.56 In the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case the ICJ decided that the reference to the changing of 
fundamental circumstances does not entail an automatic termination of a treaty.57
Scholars agree that the termination of a contract under international law because 
of the changes in fundamental circumstances is possible only if the parties have 
reached consensus on this kind of issue.58
It can be concluded that Russia used force in Crimea. No grounds for justification 
of this action exist under international law: Russia violated art 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. In attempting to justify its action, however, Russia indicated that Moscow
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was conscious of its behaviour in Crimea. But Russia’s behaviour attacked the 
international legal order directly because of its use of force. In particular, the 
minor effort to settle the dispute peacefully has to be viewed as a failure of 
Russian policy and creates the impression that the action was not spontaneous.
(b) The Referendum
On 6 March 2014, the Parliament of Crimea resolved to hold a referendum on 16 
March concerning the status of the peninsula and its affiliation to the Russian 
Federation. The referendum was held in order to obtain democratic legitimacy for
incorporation into the Russian Federation. Following the referendum, the Crimean
authorities announced that voter participation had been 82% and that 95% had 
voted in favour of the affiliation. But, even if a high percentage of the Crimean 
people had voted in favour, the question arises whether a referendum can trump 
territorial illegality and can therefore be seen as legitimising the affiliation to 
Russia. Although a referendum can be seen as a reliable gauge because it can be 
considered as an indication of public opinion, after answering this question, it still 
has to be examined whether international law provides requirements for holding a 
referendum and whether in particular circumstances these requirements are met.
In the previous century, a number of referendums were held in connection with
state-building and in order to evaluate the will of the people. Such referendums 
occurred during the process of decolonisation and after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union. Recent practice has shown that even if the majority votes in favour 
of independence, this does not lead to the creation of a new state. 
In Reference re Secession of Quebec (Quebec case), the Canadian Supreme Court 
established that in a democratic state an expression of the will of people in favour 
of independence could not be ignored but would not lead necessarily to 
independence.59 Also, state practice in this field is still inconsistent. This leads to 
the conclusion that referendums cannot solely be a precondition for independence;
however, they can trigger negotiations – as long as the referendums are valid.60
Although international law was not directly violated in this case because it was a 
matter of internal affairs, international standards exist with regard to how a 
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referendum has to be held.61 In addition, the possible prohibition of referendums 
in the Ukrainian Constitution has to be considered.
Such standards and norms are, for example, provided for in art 3 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of legislature.
The same is provided for in art 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Even if the Code of Good Practice on Referendums by 
the Venice Commission is not binding in international law, it stipulates 
international law standards, which includes the freedom, secrecy, equality and 
universality of referendums.62 The code also includes the precondition that “a 
referendum cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the 
Constitution does not provide for them …”.
In particular, the principle of freedom – provided by art 25 of the ICCPR – could
be violated. The freedom of a referendum requires the absence or at least the 
restraint of military forces of the opposing parties and the neutrality of public 
authorities. Such a situation did not exist during the time the referendum was held 
in Crimea as Russian military forces and paramilitary groups which controlled the 
peninsula were still in evidence. The area was a territory where recent displays of 
the use of force had taken place. In international law, a referendum itself becomes 
an instrument of abuse when it has taken place in an area with such a recent 
history.63 As stated above, the Code of Good Practice on Referendums stipulates 
that a referendum has to be provided for by the Ukrainian Constitution. Article 73 
of the Constitution sets out that a local referendum is not suitable for deciding on 
issues relating to altering the territory of a country.64 Therefore the referendum is 
contrary to the code and, in addition, violates not only art 73 but also arts 2 and 
134 of the Ukrainian Constitution. Besides the substantive requirements,
procedural requirements could be violated too. In particular, the questions asked
could be unclear, misleading and therefore inconsistent with international-law 
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standards on referendums. This principle includes the requirement that one 
question only may be asked and that this question can be answered with a “yes” or 
a “no”.65 The questions were: 
1. Are you in favour of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reuniting with 
Russia as a constituent part of the Russian Federation? or
2. Are you in favour of restoring the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 
1992 and of Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine?66
As can been seen, either question can be answered with a “yes” or a “no”. 
Furthermore, the second question is misleading, because in 1992 two versions of 
the Crimean Constitution were in force. One version explicitly stated that Crimea
formed a constitutive part of Ukraine, whereas the other did not.67 It can be added 
that it is also important that a certain time must elapse between the announcement 
of the referendum and the vote, because the inhabitants must have the chance to 
inform themselves about the issue and make up their mind about their vote. This 
was certainly not the case here when the time between the announcement and the 
holding of the referendum was a mere 10 days.
In conclusion, the referendum as held, is contrary to the standards and principles
laid down by international law and violated the Ukrainian Constitution. In 
addition, it has to be stated that such a referendum cannot provide legal value in 
the sense that it can be seen as a legal title for territorial change. A referendum is 
suitable only to providing for an additional democratic legitimisation of changes 
in sovereign title over territory, not as a sole justification.68 The reasons for these 
limitations on the legitimacy of the referendum in question are unclear 
preconditions and inconclusive state practice.
(c) Incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation
The day following the referendum, the Supreme National Council of Crimea
declared Crimea’s independence and, on 16 March 2014, representatives signed a 
treaty with Russia. The treaty provided for the affiliation of Crimea to the Russian 
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Federation. But the question is this: Did Crimea have the right to declare its 
independence under international law and, subsequently, could it be validly 
integrated through a treaty with the Russian Federation?
In order to investigate the question of the validity of the declaration of 
independence, one must examine the right of external self-determination and the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Kosovo case).69
Both the Crimean and the Russian authorities refer to the right of self-
determination of peoples as a foundation of the declaration of independence and 
state secession from Ukraine. Representatives of Russia declared in the Security 
Council that: 
through a free referendum, the people of Crimea have fulfilled what is enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations and a great number of fundamental 
international legal documents – their right to self-determination.70
The right of self-determination developed during the 20th century. It is 
incorporated in art 1(2) of the UN Charter and proclaimed in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, as follows:
all people have the right to freely determine, without external interference, their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 
every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter.71
But it has to be noted that claims for independence frequently cause a clash 
between the right of self-determination and the principle of the territorial integrity 
of states.72 It is commonly understood that concepts of self-determination may not 
be used to disaggregate the territory of existing nation-states.73 In the Advisory 
                                               
69 ICJ. 22 July 2010. Advisory Opinion: Accordance with International Law of Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo.
70 S/PV.7144 du 19 March 2014, 8. Available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7144.pdf (accessed on 8 September 2015); T Christakis. 2014. Self-
determination, Territorial Integrity and Fait Accompli in the Case of Crimea. Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 74: 80.
71 United Nations General Assembly. 24 October 1970. Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/25/2625.
72 Vidmar (note 58) 367.
73 Marxsen (note 3) 381.
19
Opinion on the Kosovo case, the ICJ acknowledged the right to self-
determination, but also determined that the question whether there is a right for 
part of the population to separate from an existing state does not have to be 
answered here, because the UN General Assembly only asked whether the 
declaration of independence was in accordance with international law.74 The
principle of self-determination is also expressed in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration:
The principle of self-determination may not be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states as long 
as states respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination in relation to 
minority groups.75
By now it is customary international law, backed by art 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
that the principle of territorial integrity overrides the principle of self-
determination.76 International scholars argue that the right to self-determination 
has priority only in cases of decolonisation and internal oppression of minority 
groups, known as the issue of “remedial secession”. Remedial secession theory is 
a doctrine by which an infra-state community that is a victim of oppression and 
massive violations of human rights by the encompassing state and that is unable to 
exercise its right to internal self-determination can – in certain circumstances –
resort to secession by way of ultimum remedium.77
Regarding the issue of internal oppression and remedial succession, the Supreme 
Court of Canada argued in the Quebec case78 that the right to independence 
perhaps arises only where secession would be the last resort for ending 
oppression, or where there is no meaningful arrangement in place for internal self-
determination.79 At present it is not evident, however, that there is such provision
in customary international law which would be applicable to Crimea.80 There is 
insufficient opinio juris and state practice. Cases such as Bangladesh in 1974 and 
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Kosovo in 2008 are problematic in this respect, because one was achieved with
the consent of Pakistan and the other after nine years of oppression.81 Even if such 
a right is accepted as customary international law, a situation such as that in 
Bangladesh did not occur in Crimea. Secession is an ultima ratio measure and 
therefore requires that no prospect exists of realising the inhabitants of Crimea’s
right to self-determination within the existing political system of Ukraine.82 On 
the contrary, the Ukrainian political system certainly acknowledged the special
status of Crimea. The peninsula also had the status of an autonomous republic so 
that the institutional arrangements for implementing internal self-determination 
were in place.83
Even before declaring actual independence, the Supreme Council of Crimea 
announced that they simply did not have the right to declare independence in 
terms of the right of self-determination and the legitimising referendum, but also 
from the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the Kosovo case. The latter is referred to as an 
authority that such declarations do not violate international law.84 Whether one 
can apply the rules of the Kosovo case to the Crimea case has to be examined in 
the following manner. It has to be mentioned that the judgment on the Advisory 
Opinion in the Kosovo case appears to be inconsistent, given the official position 
of Russia on Kosovo’s declaration of independence and non-recognition of the 
state by Russia.85
The UN General Assembly asked the ICJ to render an Advisory Opinion on the 
following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?”  
On 22 July 2010 the Court delivered its Advisory Opinion and declared that:
the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not 
violate general international law because international law contains no prohibition 
on declaration of independence.86
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The ICJ acknowledged that there is a relevant international practice in which 
states and the Security Council have declared such unilateral declarations of 
independence as invalid.87 The ICJ argues in these cases that the invalidity does 
not follow from the unilateral character as such, but from their close link to 
serious violations of international law:
the illegality attached to the declaration of independence thus stemmed not  from 
the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they 
were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other 
egregious violations of norm of general international law, in particular those of 
peremptory character (ius cogens).88
Up to the present time, it is unclear exactly what the current criteria are for the 
determination of such a link. But, on the other hand, it is clear that just because a 
territory has at some point in the past been the victim of an unlawful use of force,
this does not automatically bar all future attempts at altering its territorial status. 
Even if certain criteria are controversial, in the Crimean case there is evidence to 
support the nexus between the declaration of independence and the unlawful use 
of force. In the context of the ICJ ruling, Crimea’s declaration of independence
may be seen to be invalid. Not applying the Kosovo case to Crimea is in line with
the opinion of the United States and European states, who consider the situation of 
Kosovo unique and argue or suggest that the recognition of its independence 
should not become a precedent for other breakaway entities to follow.89 This
uniqueness arises from the general context of the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia and its long period under UN administration.90 In this regard, it can be 
stated that Crimea had no right to self-determination and no backup from the ICJ
and therefore the declaration of independence was invalid. 
Nevertheless, Crimea signed a treaty with Russia concerning integration with the 
Russian Federation. Article 1 of that treaty provided that the “Republic of Crimea 
is considered to be adopted in the Russian Federation from the date of signing this 
agreement”. The incorporation was, it stated, “ based on the free and voluntary 
will of the people of Crimea”.
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There are, however, other reasons why the treaty could be invalid. The agreement 
between Crimea and Russia must be a treaty under international law, because it
concerns the adoption of one state by another state. Under international law a 
treaty is ordinarily understood as an agreement between states.91 Therefore the 
question is: Was Crimea actually a state at the time it signed the treaty? There is 
no universal definition of statehood; however, international law considers art 1 of 
the Montevideo Convention on Right and Duties of States (1934) as a legal 
framework of statehood:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c) a 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even if we accept that Crimea is a territory which does not have to be definitely 
defined, the problem is whether Crimea has a functional government or the 
capacity to enter into international relations. Such an ability is in doubt, because 
Crimea – as a supposedly independent entity – would not have existed but for 
Russian military intervention. Control of Crimean territory appears to be more 
under the command of the Russian president than the Crimean authorities.92 From 
this point of view, it can be said that Crimea did not constitute a state capable of
entering into a treaty with the Russian Federation.
A second question, which concerns the validity of the treaty/agreement, is that it 
appears to be directly contrary to the peremptory norm of state territorial 
integrity.93 It is the final act in a process of annexing sovereign territory and may 
be regarded as no less integral to accomplishing that goal than the use of force 
itself.94 The treaty would therefore finalise the fruits of an unlawful use of force.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the agreement is invalid under international 
law and therefore that Crimea was not legally affiliated by the Russian Federation.
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As has been demonstrated, the actions which took place in Crimea at the 
beginning of 2014 were contrary to international law. Russia used force 
unlawfully and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea could not declare its 
independence and, consequently, could not sign the Treaty of Inclusion with the 
Russian Federation. Coming to this conclusion underlines the importance of 
art 2(4) of the UN Charter and art 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The picture is established that there is no right of secession in favour of 
Crimea. From this perspective, what the current status of Crimea under 
international law is has to be discussed.
3. Result 
Depending on one’s perspective, Crimea’s status can differ from being a part of 
Russia to being a part of Ukraine or to being an occupied territory. The unlawful 
use of force is inseparably connected to the purported subsequent alteration of the 
status of Crimea. Furthermore, the problem of de jure and de facto authorities 
arises, which influences the subsequent decision on the status of Crimea under 
international law. 
Crimea has not become an independent state at any point: it could not secede from 
Ukraine since the requirements for the right to secession had not been fulfilled.95
Owing to the invalid declaration of independence, Crimea and the Russian 
Federation could not lawfully agree by treaty that Crimea had or would become
part of the Russian Federation. Therefore, from an international-law perspective,
Crimea is still part of Ukraine.96
D. The De Jure–De Facto Dichotomy
De jure Crimea is still part of Ukraine, but de facto a different situation exists. 
There is a large presence of Russian State organs, including armed forces, in 
Crimea and Russia has already introduced Russian law to the area. Article 42 of 
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the Hague Convention No IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land
(1907) (HR) provides that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army”.97
Since the Russian Federation considers Crimea as part of its own territory, it is 
exercising direct and effective control over the territory and therefore Crimea 
must be seen as a territory occupied by Russia.98 There are various forms of 
occupation, including “belligerent” and “pacific”. The occupation of Crimea could 
be seen as belligerent. A belligerent occupation is a foreign military presence 
brought about without the consent of the state to which the occupied territory 
belongs.99 The Russian forces are present without the consent of Ukraine and 
therefore it can be stated that a situation of a belligerent occupation exists in 
Crimea.
Circumstances can vary from one territory to another. In Prosecutor v Mladen 
Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic (Natelilic case), the ICTY advanced the view that 
the occupying power “must have a sufficient force present or the capacity to send 
troops within a reasonable time to make the authority of the occupying power 
felt”.100 In the case of Crimea, Russia has deployed thousands of military forces 
throughout the entire peninsula and they have the capacity to deploy more at any 
time. Because of this fact and the refusal of the presence by the Ukraine 
authorities, it can be stated that a situation of a belligerent occupation exists in 
Crimea. 
Coming to this conclusion also underlines the importance of art 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and art 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is beyond 
doubt that forcible acquisition of territory – whether treaty-based or not – is illegal 
and without effect under international law.101
Clearly, the mere passage of time cannot “heal” the unlawfulness of an alteration 
of the status of a territory effected by force. On the other hand, it is clear that just 
because a territory has at some point in the past been a victim of an unlawful use 
of force, this does not automatically bar all future attempts at altering territorial 
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status. Therefore, hypothetically, if Ukraine at some point in the future freely 
decided to cede the territory of Crimea to the Russian Federation, a valid 
territorial status alteration could be effected.
It has to be stated that viewed from the perspective of international law Crimea is 
still part of Ukraine, but de facto it is occupied by Russia. As it is an occupied 
territory, the HR and the Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (1947) (GC IV) are applicable, even if Russia as 
an occupying state denies this and is welcomed in the area. To find an appropriate 
solution to this situation, it is necessary to highlight some crucial elements of the 
law of occupation and to compare them to the legal situation which would exist if 
the territorial alterations were lawful and valid.
In the current Crimean case, the problem is that the occupying state denies the 
status of occupation or that it is an occupying power. The purpose of further 
examination is therefore to compare the situation of an invalid and a valid 
acquisition of Crimea with a focus on the rights of the inhabitants in each 
situation. Through the comparison one can examine which legal system holds the 
better legal solution for such a situation, and what the law of occupation has to 
reclaim for the good of the inhabitants of Crimea. The hypocritical assumption of 
a change in the applicable law could be built on the argument that the law of 
occupation no longer provides an appropriate legal system. This is because it can 
no longer provide for the protection of civilians, which would be provided for, in 
comparison, in the case of a valid acquisition. Furthermore, the recent state 
practice in other occupations could substantiate such an argument. In what
follows, elementary facts of the law of occupation and the law of state succession
are first highlighted in the case of the situation which would exist if the 
attachment of Crimea had been valid. In each section, the rights of the population 
are specifically examined. Secondly, a comparison has to take place which may 
solve the issue raised.
1. Principles of the Law of Occupation
Crimea is an occupied territory. The territory is controlled by Russian authorities 
but de jure is still part of Ukraine. The occupation of Crimea by Russia is not the 
only belligerent occupation to have occurred since World War II. Prior to the 
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occupation of Crimea, there have been occasions when other states have occupied 
foreign territory: for example, Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967. Likewise, 
the Coalition occupied Iraq in 2005. International law therefore developed the law 
of occupation prior to and following World War II in order to deal with these 
situations. International law had already acknowledged the law of occupation 
during the 19th century.102 It was framed by European governments during 
conferences in Brussels (1874) and The Hague (1899).103 The result was Hague 
Regulations of 1899,104 the purpose of which was to set rules concerning the 
protection of civilians under occupation and protect the interests of the ousted
government.105
The law of occupation is part of international humanitarian law (IHL) and was 
developed through the concepts of sovereignty and statehood. The aim of the 
doctrine of occupation is to solve the problem which arises when a foreign state 
exercises power in the territory of another sovereign state.106 It can be defined as 
the effective control of a power over a territory to which this power has no 
sovereign title, without the consequence that the ousted government loses its
sovereignty over that territory.107 Because no transfer of sovereignty takes place, 
the main challenge the law faces is to clarify the interrelationship between the 
occupying power, the ousted government and the inhabitants for the duration of 
the occupation.108
The rules of the law of occupation emerged from a conviction in Europe that 
sovereignty may not be alienated though the use of force.109 The main rules and 
regulations are provided in the Regulations annexed to HR and GC IV. These lay 
down the basic legal framework within which an occupying power must operate. 
The HR focuses on resolving a conflict between the interests of the occupying 
power, the ousted government and the inhabitants of the occupied territory. By 
way of contrast, the effect of the GC IV is to ensure the interests of the 
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inhabitants. The principles set out in the HR and GC IV apply to any belligerent 
occupation, irrespective of the lawfulness of the use of force.110 It has to be seen 
in connection with the main principle of IHL that the law applies equally to both 
sides of the conflict. The law of occupation is not concerned with the status of the 
territory prior to its occupation, so that its application by an occupant is without 
prejudice to any underlying dispute concerning the territory.111 The law of 
occupation promises reciprocal guarantees of political continuity and attempts to 
keep this promise by promoting certain principles. The basis of and fundamental 
background to these principles is art 43 HR: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.
It is seen as a mini-constitution for the occupation administration.112
The inherent principle of art 43 HR is that the military occupation of territory 
during war does not confer sovereignty upon the occupying power.113 The 
displaced sovereign power loses possession of the occupied territory de facto but 
retains title de jure.114 The occupant is expected to fill the temporary vacuum 
created by the ousting of the local government and maintain its bases of power 
until the conditions for the latter’s return are mutually agreed upon.115 The status 
is merely temporary, which has several consequences. In this connection it can be 
stated that a purported annexation by the occupant power has no effect upon the 
rights conferred by Convention on the inhabitants of the territory.116 This is 
underlined by art 47 GC IV and art 4 of the Additional Protocol I of the GC IV:
The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion 
of agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the Parties 
to the conflict. Neither the occupation of a territory nor the application of the 
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Convention and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in 
question.
In similar vein, the ICJ – in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory117 – concluded 
that events unfolding in the territories under Israeli occupation have done nothing 
to alter Israel’s status as an occupying power.118
A second principle inherent in art 43 HR is the obligation to fulfil governmental 
functions in the territory. The purpose is to protect the civilian population in an 
occupied territory from a significant decline in ordinary life.119 This obligation 
must be read as an empowerment to do what is necessary to carry out the allotted 
tasks of maintaining law and order.120 This is underpinned by art 25(4) GC IV:
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and 
security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
The choice of the necessary means is left to the occupying authorities as long as 
they “ensure” public order and safety. The occupying authorities are thereby 
permitted to foster the economic and social dimensions in the occupied 
territory.121 The duty continues even in the event of hostilities in the occupied 
territory. In Physicians for Human Rights et al v IDF Commander of Gaza (Rafia 
case), the Israeli Supreme Court propounded the view that the occupying power 
must refrain from actions that harm innocent civilians and must ensure supplies of 
food and medication to the civilian population.122
Thirdly, art 43 HR includes the principle that the occupying power must respect 
the laws in already force. “Respect” means that the occupying authority has to 
maintain the laws in force and not modify, suspend or replace them with its own 
legislation.123 Changes in the law of the territory will be contrary to international 
law unless they are required for the legitimate needs of the occupation. Concerns 
could be raised that the wholesale duplication of legislation in the occupied area 
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and the assimilation of the legal landscape of the two regions would effectively 
amount to be a de facto annexation of the occupied territory.124 In order to counter
these concerns, art 64 GC IV can be put forward. This article is seen as 
amplification and clarification of art 43 HR.125 According to art 64 GC IV, 
exceptions can be made and the occupying power can legislate if changes are 
necessary for the security of the armed forces. Those needs can vary and can be 
seen differently by each occupant. Furthermore, the occupying power is allowed 
to legislate in order to implement the regulations of the GC IV. As a signatory 
party, the occupying power cannot leave domestic legislation in place that clashes 
with the GC IV. 
Finally, the occupying power can legislate on issues related to the needs of the 
civilian population. In addition, the question has to be resolved whether the 
occupying power is – in the name of necessity – allowed to make institutional 
changes. In this regard, art 47 GC IV has to be cited in full:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not deprived, in any case or 
in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, nor by any 
agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territory and the 
occupying power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole part or part of 
the occupied territory.
The tenor of the article is that the occupying authority should not be allowed to 
circumvent their protection obligations to and benefits for the civilian population 
through the introduction of institutional changes.126 In a similar manner, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in Loizudou v Turkey (Loizidou
case) that:
the obligation to secure human rights in an area under effective control outside 
the national territory, derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised 
directly, though its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.127
Changing the configuration of political institutions is an activity that exceeds the 
military government’s powers.128 Lastly, it should be mentioned that changes in 
the law by the displaced powers are not applicable in the occupied territory.129
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2. Citizenship and Rights of the Population under the Law of Occupation
After introducing the basic principles and rules of the law of occupation, in the 
following section the rights of the populations protected under the law of 
occupation, including the question of nationality and human rights, are examined 
further.
Originally, the population of an occupied territory had no rights. A new 
development started with the codification of the Hague Regulations (HR) in 1899 
and 1907. The Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (1945-1946) stated that the 
Regulations were seen as customary law during World War II.130 One of the legal 
consequences of World War II concerning the protection of civilians is to be 
found in the Fourth GC IV of 1949. The most relevant articles with regard to the 
protection and rights of civilians in the time of occupation can be found in arts
42–56 HR, 27–34 GC IV and 47–48 GC IV. 
But before one can take a closer look at the actual rights of the population, it is 
important to note that the HR and GC IV differ in their application of ratio 
personae. The HR does not distinguish between different categories of civilian:
the persons who should be protected are “inhabitants of the occupied territory” or 
the “population” in general.131 In comparison to the HR, the GC IV applies to 
“protected persons”. Article 4 GC IV defines “protected persons” as:
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in 
case of a conflict or occupation, in hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying 
Power of which they are not nationals.
A special problem in the Crimean situation is the fact that Russia has begun a 
nationalisation programme which includes granting Russian nationality to the 
inhabitants of Crimea. The granting of nationality is within the jurisdiction of
every state, that is, every state is free to choose to whom they wish to grant 
nationality.132 This means that those inhabitants of Crimea carrying Russian 
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passports are no longer “protected persons” under the GC IV and therefore cannot 
claim any rights protected by it. However, the granting of nationality also faces
limitations from an international-law perspective. One of these limitations says the 
granting of nationality is accepted if there is an actual close relationship between 
the granting state and the concerned person.133 Such a relationship must be 
detectable by objective criteria, for example, by residence or family 
relationships.134 It is questionable whether such a relationship exists in the case of 
Crimea, because not every inhabitant in the peninsula fulfils these requirements. 
In addition, art 47 GC IV has to be mentioned: 
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case 
or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory …
The main purpose of the GC IV – in particular art 47 – is that changes which are 
introduced by the occupying power must not lead to protected persons’ being 
deprived of the rights and safeguards provided for them.135 Therefore a collective 
grant of nationality would not affect the situation of any inhabitants of Crimea as 
protected persons.136 Further arguments can be seen in the following when it 
comes to the influence of the law of occupation on the nationality of the 
inhabitants of an occupied territory.
The first right that has to be mentioned is the right that civilians are entitled to 
respect for their person, honour, family rights, and religious conviction and 
practice. This right is provided by art 46 HR: family honour and rights, the life of 
persons, and private property as well as religious convictions and practice must be 
respected.
This protection of inhabitants is also laid down in art 27 GC IV. This rule has a 
human rights content and therefore must be interpreted in the light of provisions 
for the protection of human rights.137 The general rule of human treatment has the 
purpose of guaranteeing the enjoyment of human rights to which all human beings 
are entitled and these rights have to be respected by the occupying power at all 
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times. Exceptions are permitted only in special situations of occupation. The right 
to physical integrity involves the prohibition of acts impairing individual life or 
health.138 The obligation to respect family rights is intended to safeguard the 
marriage ties and the community of parents and children constituting a family.139
In times of religious war and religious opposites it is important to note that the 
inhabitants have the right to their religious convictions being respected by the 
occupying power. This right implies having the freedom to believe or not to 
believe and change from one religion to another.140 The inhabitants must also have 
the freedom to practise their religion unhindered, without any restriction. Besides 
respecting the individual rights of the civilian population, art 46 HR and art 27.
GC IV provide that the occupying power must also respect and leave unchanged 
the social context in which the inhabitants of the occupied territories live.141
In order to strengthen the principle introduced by art 27 GC IV, the International 
Red Cross Conference adopted art 32 GC IV: 
The High Contracting Parties specially agree that each of them is prohibited from 
taking any measures of such character as to cause the physical suffering or 
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not 
only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical of 
scientific experiments not necessitated by medical treatment of a protected 
person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or 
military agents.
The purpose of the article is to ensure that every person shall receive humane 
treatment. In this context it is important to state that the prohibition is absolute. 
The prohibition covers all forms of torture, whether they form part of penal 
procedure or are quasi- or extra-judicial acts and whatever the means employed.142
It is not necessary that the acts cause a bodily injury. Torture in occupied territory 
is prohibited even if the penal legislation of the occupying territory provides for 
it.143 The occupying power has to repeal the law in such cases, according to art 64 
GC IV. The acts listed in art 32 GC IV are not final, which means that other 
treatments that are not listed can be added. The argument for such a view is that 
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the wording of the article has a general character and therefore is open to further 
interpretation.
The inhabitants of an occupied territory also have the right to their survival being
ensured. This right is provided for by art 54(1) Protocol I of GC IV, which 
prohibits “starvation as a method of warfare”. According to art 54(2) Protocol I of 
GC IV, it is forbidden to destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, livestock, drinking 
water, in order to starve the civilians, to cause them to move away or for any other 
motive.144 This right is additionally supported by art 55 GC IV.
The inhabitants furthermore have the right to remain in the occupied territory. 
Article 49 GC IV provides that: 
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons 
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any 
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Unlawful deportations or transfers constitute a grave breach of the Convention in 
accordance with art 147 GC IV and they are considered a war crime according to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICTY distinguished 
deportation and transfer in the way that 
deportation requires the displacement of persons across a national border … and 
forcible transfer which may take place within national boundaries.145
This right is of great importance to the Crimean Tartars because while the Soviet 
Union existed they were deported from Crimea.
When it comes to the rights and protection of citizens, another important factor is 
the question of what happens to the citizenship of the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory, especially when the occupying power considers the territory to be a part 
of its own territory. One of the main principles of the law of occupation is that the 
occupation is just a temporary situation and that the displaced government 
remains de jure the sovereign of the territory. This leads to the conclusion that the 
inhabitants remain nationals of the sovereign state and do not become nationals of 
the occupying power, merely because of the de facto situation of occupation. On 
the other hand, it is a principle that a sovereign state can decide by itself to whom
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it grants nationality.146 These freedoms can be limited by human rights 
considerations and the rights of other states. According to art 4 of the Russian law 
of 23 March 2014, “On the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the 
Russian Federation and the Creation of New Federal Subjects – the Republic of 
Crimea and the City of Federal Significance Sevastopol”, citizens of Ukraine and 
stateless persons who were permanently residing in Crimea as of 18 March are 
recognised as citizens of Russia, unless they declare within one month their desire 
to maintain another citizenship or to remain stateless. The question is how to 
handle such actions under international law. It can be stated that this action could
cause a conflict with Ukrainian municipal law, because Ukraine has a long-
standing policy of non-recognition of multiple citizenship. However, Ukrainian 
officials have stated that Ukraine will continue considering Crimean residents, 
including those who apply for and are issued with Russian passports, as citizens of 
Ukraine and will guarantee them political and economic rights. Acknowledging 
that this “to a certain extent” goes against Ukrainian legislation, a Ukrainian 
Cabinet of Ministers official explained that the case of illegal annexation of 
Ukrainian territory and “forceful issuance” of passports by Russia are 
circumstances that warrant an exception.147
From an international-law perspective, the principle of the law of occupation and 
Court decisions must examined. Some arguments have already been presented in 
the context of the question whether Crimeans are still “protected persons” under 
art 4 GC IV. In addition, another principle – which is inherent in art 43 HR – that 
requires mentioning is that the political institutions and public life in general 
should be allowed to continue with as little disturbance as possible.148 Not only 
legal institutions of the state but also the social structure of the population of an 
occupied territory shall be left unchanged.149 As a consequence, from these 
principles one can conclude that the granting of citizenship by the occupying 
power to the inhabitants of the occupied territory is a breach of international law. 
This view is underpinned by the decision of the ECHR in Al-Jedda v United 
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Kingdom (Al-Jedda case).150 The court stated that international law prevents an 
occupying power from making fundamental changes to the law of nationality in 
the occupied territory.151 From this point of view, it can be concluded that 
granting Russian citizenship to the Crimean people violates the law of occupation.
This result is in line with the view presented above that the inhabitants do not lose 
their status as “protected persons” under art 4 GC IV.
Lastly, one of the most important issues has to be examined: How can the 
inhabitants can invoke their human rights in a situation of occupation? The human 
rights system developed after World War II and became codified in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Departures from that are several principal human 
rights treaties, for example, the ICCPR or the ECHR in connection with the law of 
occupation. The question then arises how these two legal systems interact. Some 
scholars see them as not applicable in the same situation. Human rights law and 
IHL are seen as two distinct disciplines of international law. Because human 
rights law was designed for times of peace, it is argued that human rights law is 
inapplicable in times of war. Furthermore, scholars argue that this cannot result in 
a derogation of the right of life.152 On the one hand, art 4(2) ICCPR states that the 
right to life is not disposable, but, on the other hand, the authors did not intend to 
prohibit killing in times of war.153 It is argued that they simply thought the 
Covenant was not applicable.154 In the past decade, the question has also been put 
before the ICJ. In the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear weapons case) the Court confirmed for the first time 
that the rights contained in the ICCPR apply during times of war, but 
contravention of those rights “can only be decided by reference to the law 
applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself”.155
A further development appeared in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
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Territory156 and in the judgment in Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (Congo case).157 The ICJ is of the view that human rights law 
applies in occupied territory:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law.158
Furthermore, art 72 of the Additional Protocol I of GV IV sets out the range of
applicable human rights independently: 
The provisions of this section are additional to the rules concerning humanitarian 
protection of civilians and civilian object in the power of the Party to the conflict 
contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, … as well as to other applicable 
rules of international law relating to the protection of fundamental human rights 
during international armed conflict.
In accordance with the article, the rules are deemed to be complementary to IHL 
and therefore the law of occupation.159 It has to be kept in mind that states have to 
be contracting parties, because otherwise the rules apply only to the extent that
they are part of customary law. The inhabitants of occupied territories are in 
principle entitled to benefit from the customary corpus of human rights that 
coexists with the law of occupation.160 However, in times of war some human 
rights are derogable and others are non-derogable. Non-derogable rights are the
right to life freedom from torture and slavery. Because of the distinction between 
derogable and non-derogable rights in human rights law, it is important how the 
law of occupation and the human rights law interact. For the most part, enough 
room exists for a symbiotic relationship between the two legal systems. The 
problem is that the derogable human rights may be suspended in wartime, so 
inhabitants are dependent on the rights which apply during belligerent occupation. 
Some of these are similar to the human rights system, for example, art 32 GC IV,
which states: 
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The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited 
from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or 
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not 
only to murder, torture, corporal punishment …, but also to any other measure of 
brutality whether applied by civilian or military agent. 
In the other side human rights law can fill the gap when the law of occupation is 
silent or incomplete? Furthermore, the GC IV may not apply to every inhabitant in 
the occupied territory. That is why it fills a further gap of protection and provides 
a comprehensive protection of human rights in the territory.161 In this context it is 
important to note one important case, where a court examined human rights 
violations in occupied territory – the Loizidou case decided by the ECHR. In this 
case the violation of property rights was attributed to Turkey, which invaded
North Cyprus unlawfully and had de facto control over the area. Because of this 
de facto control, the Court constituted jurisdiction within the meaning of art 1 of 
the Convention.162
In occupied territory inhabitants have the opportunity to appeal to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).163 It is important to note that 
even if the Russian Federation were to reject an initiative of the ICRC to protect 
the inhabitants of Crimea, the Court has the opportunity to use its right of 
initiative to visit and care for political detainees.164 This right is therefore of great
importance in cases where a person is detained in a territory the status of which is 
controversial and where there is a divergence of views whether the law of armed 
conflict applies or not.165
As has been seen, a close relationship between the law of occupation and human 
rights law exists. Both legal systems support and assist one another, which 
consequently provides a high level of protection.
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After having a closer look at the law of occupation and the rights of the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory, it is important for the purposes of 
comparison to examine the situation of a valid Crimean succession to Russia.
3. Principles of the Law of State Succession
In the following section, the focus is on the principles of the law of state 
succession. Such a situation would arise if someone considers the admission of 
Crimea into the Russian Federation valid. First, it is important to examine the 
main principles of state succession. Following that, I examine how the rights of 
the inhabitants would change in such a situation.
The landscape of a state is not fixed for all time. All over the world, new states 
have arisen or ceased to exist during the past centuries. Political entities are 
therefore not immutable. As a basic definition, it can be said that the problem of 
state succession arises whenever a change of sovereignty over territory occurs.166
Whatever form a change of sovereignty may take, it always involves a disruption 
of legal continuity and rules of law are necessary to minimise the consequences of 
this disruption.167 There are two main forms of state succession: partial and 
universal. In the former, a state loses is sovereignty over a part of its territory but 
an entity survives in which rights and duties remain constant.168 In the latter case,
a state ceases to exist and the rights and duties become invested in the new 
entity.169
It has to be borne in mind that in Crimea only a partial succession could take
place, because the predecessor state still exists. In the case where partial state 
succession exists, there is a surviving person to whom antecedent rights and 
obligations may still be attributed.170 In the Crimean case, Ukraine would be the 
predecessor state and Russia the successor state.
There are several concepts which determine the legal consequences of state 
succession. The first – based on Roman law – considers the continuity of the legal 
personality in the estate which is passed on by inheritance.171 The contrary 
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approach follows the idea that there is no transfer of rights, obligations or property 
from the predecessor state to the successor state.172 It is import that the question of 
state succession be distinguished from the question of succession of governments. 
In the latter case, whatever changes occur in the officers or form of government, 
the state is unaffected. Changes in government include both changes through the 
usual democratic elections under the constitution and through non-constitutional 
means.173 The new government will continue to be bound by the rights and 
obligations created by the old government.
The important rules when it comes to the law of state succession are found in 
customary international law and two relevant conventions: the Vienna Convention 
on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978 (which entered into force 
in 1996) and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 (which is not yet in force, but is reflected in 
the rules of customary international law).174
One of the main problems in the field of state succession is the question of what 
the consequences of the succession on treaties are to which the predecessor state 
was a party. With regard to the influence of succession to treaties, it is important 
to distinguish between the different forms of state succession. In the case of 
Crimea the consequences of partial succession have to be examined: customary 
law and art 15 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to Treaties 
provide that the general rule is that the treaties of the predecessor state cease to 
apply to the territory under new sovereignty, while the treaties of the successor 
state extend to the territory.175
Lastly, the rules that are in place with regard to succession to state property should 
be mentioned. The key rules are provided by customary international law.176 The 
general rule postulates that only the property of the predecessor state passes 
automatically to the successor state.177 The relevant law for determining what 
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state property comprises is the municipal law of the predecessor state. According 
to art 8 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts, “state property” means “property, rights and 
interests, which, at the date of succession of states, were, according to the internal 
law of the predecessor state, owned by that state”. This rule provided by 
international law applies not only to immovable property; it also applies to 
movable property.178   
After this overview of the relevant rules of state succession law, in the following 
section the focus will be at the rights and nationality question in the case of a valid 
Crimea succession.
4. Citizenship and Rights of the Population under the Law of State Succession
The act of state succession is not only a major change in terms of sovereignty; it 
also affects the inhabitants of the assigned territory.
First, it has to be clarified what nationality the inhabitants of the territory which 
changed its sovereignty will have. The terms under which a state can grant 
nationality are solely under its control. In the case of partial succession, the issue 
of nationality will generally depend on the domestic law of the predecessor and
the successor state. The laws of the former will determine the extent to which the 
inhabitants of an area to be ceded to another authority will retain nationality after 
the change of sovereignty, whereas the laws of the successor state will prescribe 
the conditions under which the new nationality will be granted.179 In general, the 
rules provide that the inhabitants of the territory in question take the nationality of 
the successor state.180 But it also possible that the predecessor state puts rules into
force which provide that the inhabitants retain their original nationality. Therefore
the situation of dual nationality can be created. The state practice often depends 
on the actual circumstances, because sometimes nationality is also granted 
automatically.181 It should be noted that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness provides that states involved in the cession of territory should ensure 
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that no person becomes statelessness as a result of change of sovereignty.182
Russia’s position with regard to nationality was that Crimeans could apply for 
Russian nationality up to a certain day. On the other hand, Ukraine assured the
Crimean inhabitants that they would not lose their Ukrainian citizenship. 
Consequently, a situation of dual nationality can exist. 
Besides the question of nationality, we have a look at the human rights situation 
that would exist if the secession of Crimea were to be valid. In that case, the 
inhabitants of Crimea would be entitled to the benefits of the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as 
well as of the ECHR, because these treaties apply to the entire territory of Russia, 
protecting all persons which are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Russia.183
However, not only nationals of the predecessor state would be inhabitants and 
therefore affected by the act of state succession. It is also important to consider the 
effect on the acquired rights of foreign nationals and if there is a change of 
treatment of foreigners. An “acquired right” is any legal interest, other than the 
personal freedom to pursue an avocation, which is reducible to monetary terms.184
Included are real and personal estates of all kinds, whereas political and certain 
economic advantages are not included.185 It is one of the fundamental principles of 
international law that the acquired rights of foreigners must be respected.186 In the 
case of state succession this means that the change of sovereignty has no effect on 
such rights.187 The extent of protection extends so far that if, for example, a 
foreign national’s property is involved in a dispute; a diplomatic claim may be 
made if the successor state does not respect it.188 However, after a transfer of 
sovereignty the successor state may expropriate private property rights to an 
extent permitted by international law.189 But the state must not only respect the 
property rights of foreigners; it is also bound by the principle enshrined in the 
“Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens”. The origins of this principle were 
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developed by Hugo Grotius and are based primarily on natural law.190 The 
Minimum Standard is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD): 
as a norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of aliens, 
by providing for a minimum set of principles which States, regardless of their 
domestic legislation and practice, must respect when dealing with foreign 
nationals and their property.191
Russia is also obliged to respect the international minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens. This was set out in LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v Mexico (Neer 
case):
the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, 
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty or to an 
insufficient of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.192
In connection with the treatment of foreigners, the international standards are still 
in force, as both Ukraine and Russia are bound by them. Importantly, the 
diplomatic protection is still in force. It has merely been altered by the fact that 
the offending state is now Russia. 
Because in the situation of state succession, a new legal system is being
introduced in terms of which special protection rules for the inhabitants of the 
ceded territory are not required. Unlike the case of belligerent occupation – a 
temporary control of another government over a foreign territory – the situation 
under state succession is permanent. After a while, the inhabitants usually become 
citizens of the succession state and under the jurisdiction of the domestic law. 
There are no special needs for the international-law system to intervene to protect.
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5. Comparison between the Law of Occupation and the Law of State Succession
After introducing the law of occupation and the law of state succession, with a
respective focus on the citizenship and rights of the inhabitants of Crimea, the 
comparison has to be made. First, the impact on the nationality is compared. In 
the following section we compare the human rights situation, certain provided 
rights, and the treatment of foreigners. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages 
of the respective legal field in terms of Crimea are examined. 
The first comparison to make is the impact of occupation and state succession on 
the nationality of the inhabitants. In the situation of belligerent occupation the 
inhabitants usually remain nationals of the predecessor state. In the case of 
Crimea, one has to bear in mind that Russia introduced Russian citizenship to 
Crimea, which forced the Ukrainian government to allow an exception to the law 
of citizenship. The law provides that Crimeans do not lose their Ukrainian 
nationality even if they hold Russian passports. They therefore have the advantage 
of dual citizenship. In contrast, the law of state succession provides that the 
inhabitants of the former state become citizens of the successor state. But such a 
situation does not appear even in the event of a valid succession of Crimea 
because Ukraine is granting nationality to the inhabitants of Crimea. Therefore the 
situations do not differ as regards to citizenship: in both situations the nationals 
have the chance of dual citizenship.
In what follows, the human rights situation is compared. It is accepted in 
international law that, even if human rights law and the law of occupation are 
different areas of law, they are applicable at the same time. Human rights law and 
the law of occupation have the benefit that they can complement each other and 
fill gaps if a lack of protection occurs in one of them. Furthermore, it can be stated 
that for the application of human rights guarantees it is irrelevant whether the 
succession of Crimea was invalid or valid, because Russia signed the ICCPR or 
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ECHR. Therefore the inhabitants can invoke their human rights in the same way 
they could do in the case of a belligerent occupation.193
It should be mentioned that some scholars do not agree with founding the
application of the human rights law in both legal fields equally. Their concern is 
raised that the merging of human rights law into IHL rather than expanding 
human protection may serve to undermine it as well as to legitimise violations of 
the rights of the inhabitants living under occupation.194 It is argued that the 
introduction of a rights analysis into the context of occupation abstracts and 
extrapolates from the context of occupation and puts all involved persons –
citizens of the occupying state and people living under occupation – on a 
supposedly equal plane.195 This move weakens the equilibrium of the law of 
occupation, whose original purpose is the special protection of inhabitants of the 
occupied territory and widens the justification for limiting their rights beyond the 
scope allowed in a strict IHL analysis.196 Up to this point those concerns can be 
raised, but the actual undermining of the law of occupation by human rights law is
not yet a fact. Rather one must lay the focus on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory197 and on the judgment in the Congo case.198 The ICJ considered the 
possibility that actions can be judged not only under the law of occupation but 
also under the human rights law. The inhabitants therefore enjoy the same amount 
of protection of their human rights, regardless of the validity of the alteration of 
the territory of Crimea.
Next, I examine whether the actual rights provided by the areas of law differ in 
some way. On the one hand, the HR and GC IV provide for the rights of 
inhabitants of occupied territory. Examples of these rights are the rights to life, 
property and religious practice in art 46 HR and art 27 GC IV or the right of 
human treatment in art 32 HR, which includes the prohibition of torture. All these
provided rights have in common is that they have a strong human rights nature. 
These given rights ensure a minimum standard of protection. In addition, the 
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domestic law, for example, the domestic criminal law, of the former sovereign 
applies in the occupied territory. If the succession were valid, Crimea would be a 
part of the Russian Federation and the Russian Constitution and Russian domestic 
law would apply. The Russian Constitution provides similar rights to the HR and 
GC IV. For example, art 20 constitutes the right to life; art 21 provides that 
nobody should be tortured or treated inhumanely. But in the situation of state 
succession a whole new legal system will be introduced to a territory. This will 
cause a lot of confusion in the beginning, but seen in the long term can lead to
more legal certainty than the law of occupation in the convergence with human 
rights law and the domestic law of the seceded state.
Furthermore, the treatment of aliens can be distinguished between that in occupied 
territory and the situation resulting from state succession. According to the HR, all 
the inhabitants of an occupied territory can invoke the rights provided by the 
Convention. The HR does not distinguish between certain groups of people, 
which means aliens are treated the same as everybody else under the HR. Under 
the requirements of art 4 GC IV foreigners can be determined as “protected 
persons”. In this regard, art 48 GC IV states that:
Protected persons, who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is 
occupied, may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory subject to the 
provisions of Article 35.
This provision applies specifically to foreigners in occupied territory.199 But even 
if foreigners are not covered by art 4 GC IV, there is an applicable protection 
system. First, the ordinary law of the predecessor state remains applicable;200 this 
means that if violations take place, the home state (ie the state in which an 
individual is a national) can also take steps to protect its own citizens. In terms of 
international law this means that states have to adopt measures of diplomatic 
protection. Furthermore, arts 13–26 GC IV also apply to all foreigners, even if 
they are not included in art 4 GC IV, because these articles relate to all the 
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inhabitants of a territory.201 Additional protection is also provided by art 75 
Additional Protocol I of GC IV: 
In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this 
Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do not 
benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this 
Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a 
minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction 
based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other 
similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and 
religious practices of all such persons.
The situations of refugees in occupied territories should now be considered 
briefly. Because refugees are not a particular threat to the occupying power, they 
have to be treated like any other foreigner in an occupied territory.202 In particular
Russia, as the occupying power in Crimea, has to respect the asylum law, which 
was in force before the occupation began.203 It is also acknowledged that refugees 
are protected person in terms of art 4 GC IV and that – by extension of art 48 GC 
IV – refugees can also invoke the rights provided by this article.204 In situations of 
state succession the international minimum standards for the treatment of aliens 
apply; this was argued in the Neer case. This standard requires proper respect for 
the life, liberty and property of aliens.205 It is also supported by the UN General 
Assembly Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals 
of the Country in which They Live.206 In regard to “diplomatic protection”, it is to 
be noted that in the case of its actions in Crimea, Russia is now the offending 
state. Furthermore, the acquired rights of foreigners, which they could claim
before the incursions took place in Crimea, must be respected by Russia. The law 
applicable to refugees in Crimea is now the Russian asylum law. It should be 
noted that in both circumstances the mechanism of diplomatic protection applies. 
Furthermore, it can be stated that twice the effort is reconcilable to introduce a 
minimum standard of protection for all kinds of foreigner, besides the 
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international minimum standard. In addition, refugees are protected in both legal 
systems. From the perspective of an inhabitant who is a foreigner in occupied 
Crimea it barely makes any difference whether the territory is occupied or a form 
of state succession took place. The level of protection is high because of the 
diplomatic protection foreigners and refugees receive.
(a) The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Law of Occupation and the Law of 
State Succession
Finally, one must compare and analyse the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of the two legal systems. Initially, the advantages of state 
succession have to be examined. The acceptance of state succession has the 
advantage of a reduced potential for conflict and therefore the risk of an ongoing 
war for future decades is lower than that in other regions of the world. The lower 
potential for conflict stems from the fact that Crimea has been – from a historic 
point of view – part of Russia and it became a part of Ukraine only because 
Khrushchev assigned it to Ukraine. Out of this historic solidarity the strong
sympathy for Russia in this region stems. The degrees of sympathy are also 
indicated through the social structures on the peninsula: a large percentage of 
inhabitants are Russian passport-holders or at least speak Russian. Such a result is 
underpinned by the referendum, which was held in February 2014. Independently 
of the legality of the referendum there is reason to believe that a large percentage 
of inhabitants voted in favour of integration into the Russian Federation. 207 Russia 
also has a strong economic influence in this region, which reduces the potential 
for conflict. Another factor that cannot be discounted is the fact that Russia has 
stationed her Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. There is a constant accumulation of 
Russian forces in this region, which has an intimidating influence. 
To put Crimea in a position of a potentially high conflict area through comparison 
with the Israel–Palestine conflict is misplaced, because these conflicts differ 
considerably. First, the Crimea conflict is not characterised by religious fanaticism
but rather by nationalist tensions. On the other hand, is the ongoing conflict of a 
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shorter period of time and the boundaries are not that hardened. A final point 
which as to be mentioned in the context of the advantage of reduced potential of
conflict is the fact that Russia is one of the world powers. The pressure Russia can 
put on opposition tendencies is great, added to which is the prospect of a military 
conflict with Russia. All these points influence the assumption that state 
succession would lower the potential for conflict.
A second advantage of the hypothetical assumption that a state succession took 
place in Crimea is that in such a situation a uniform legal system would have been 
introduced. The takeover of the Russian legal system first would mean that the 
new territory does not have to produce its own new legal system. In the case of 
introducing a new legal system the drafters of the law often face a clash of 
interests between different represented groups, which could lead to an 
unsatisfying result. Furthermore, the already existing legal structures could be 
adopted. This would also lead to a reduction in administrative structures, which 
would reduce costs. Importantly, it has to be mentioned that a takeover would 
mean that access to the ordinary courts would be both fast and controlled. 
However, the most important aspect of this advantage is the high level of legal 
certainty, which goes along with a situation of state succession. Legal certainty is 
based on the clarity, resistance, predictability and warranty of legal norms, 
specific legal obligations and rights. Legal certainty should encourage in the 
population a higher trust in the legal system. Such an effect cannot be created in a 
situation of belligerent occupation, because of the parallel application of areas of 
law and the different existing responsibilities.
The last advantage of state succession is the fact that the treatment of aliens is 
internationally regulated. This further encourages legal certainty. Legal certainty, 
as we have seen, is an important factor when it comes to the advantages of state 
succession. The certainty of a functioning legal system should not be 
underestimated after a conflict, where force was used and a lot of people had to 
suffer rights violations. 
On the other hand, one cannot deny that there are also disadvantages, from the 
perspective of the inhabitants of Crimea, that arise if one assumes the actions in 
Crimea as a valid state succession. The first disadvantage is the danger of the 
oppression of minorities. This arises from the fact that several different ethnic 
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groups are present in Crimea. The fact that the Russians, not the Ukrainians, are 
now in power increases the concern about oppression as it highlights Russia’s
handling of minority groups in the past. This concerns not only oppression during 
the time of the Soviet Union, but more recent examples such as that of the 
Chechens in the 1990s. Furthermore, Russia and the Crimean Tartars share a 
special history going back to the beginning of the 19th century, when the Crimean 
Tartars were the majority group in Crimea. In the 1930s, they constituted a 
relative majority in the region’s government and were recognised as a separate 
nation in legal acts of the Russian Empire and the USSR.208 In May 1944, 
however, the mass deportation of Crimean Tartars took place. In the later years 
they had to face further restrictions, for example with regard to their residence and 
their property.209 It was not until 1988, when indications of the breakdown of the 
USSR first appeared, that a mass return of Crimean Tartars to the peninsula took 
place.210 On 14 November 1989, the USSR Supreme Court decided in an official 
declaration that the deportation of Crimean Tartars had been illegal.211 Because of 
their history of deportations, representatives of the Crimean Tartars are concerned
that such acts may happen again. The danger is also that renewed oppression of 
minority groups would automatically increase the likelihood of potential conflict 
in this region. It should be in Russia’s interests that such a development does not 
occur.
From the position of the inhabitants of Crimea another disadvantage of state 
succession is the attitude of Russia towards human rights. Russia signed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions, for example, the 
ICCPR. However, human rights organisations have reported many violations of 
human rights. In the Caucasus region in particular, people suffer torture, 
discrimination and arbitrary detention. The organisation “Freedom House” 
evaluates Russia as a “not-free” country. During the 2014 Soyi Olympic Games 
the Western media received a first-hand impression of how freedom of speech and 
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homosexual people are treated.212 Human rights violations in Crimea therefore
cannot be ruled out.
Besides introducing the advantages and disadvantages, one must also illustrate the 
advantages and disadvantages of the law of occupied territory from the 
perspective of the Crimean inhabitants. In what follows, I examine the advantages 
of the law of occupied territory. The first is that the Crimea is under intense 
international observation, the reasons for this being the ongoing conflict between 
Ukraine and the pro-Russian rebels in the eastern region of the Ukraine and 
international agreement that the Crimea has the special status of occupied 
territory. Under international observation the inhabitants must have less fear of 
radical changes in law and society being introduced. In this connection, a 
comparison with the Israel–Palestine conflict is possible, because here the parties 
also argue about the status and the consequences of Israel’s actions, which are 
continuously under international observation. This observation ensures that the 
issue is forever present and discussed in international law and at peace 
conferences. Furthermore, the international media attention is still intense, which 
increases the international observation. For the inhabitants it is accompanied by a 
sense of protection: Russia has to be careful what kind of measures it will 
introduce to the region. If some of these measures are in opposition to the 
international view, Russia will have to face international sanctions and the danger 
of potentially increasing conflict. The international observation will not cease as 
long the conflict in Eastern Ukraine remains unresolved and incidents such as the 
shooting down of a KLM aircraft occur. 
Another advantage of the law of occupation is the human rights character of the 
rights provided for in the HR and GC IV. The human rights character of the rights 
holds a great benefit for the inhabitants and secures a standard of protection. The 
protection standard is quite high because of the international character of human 
rights and concerns about their scope of protection. In this connection it can be 
seen as a further advantage that not even the law of occupation in influenced by 
human rights, but also the fact the human rights law itself is applicable in 
occupied territory. This increases the protection of the inhabitants further. An 
independent applicable area of law, which is under the control of international 
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community, strengthens the rights of the Crimean population. Furthermore, the 
human rights law can fill gaps in protection in the law of occupation; such a gap-
filling duty occurs, for example, regarding the freedom of expression (art 10 
ECHR and art 19 ICCPR). In the law of occupation there is no equivalent to such 
a right.213
A third advantage of the law of occupation from the viewpoint of the inhabitants 
is that the law attaches importance to continuity of law. The inhabitants benefit in 
the way that the conversion to a new legal system is not that substantial. In the 
situation of occupation a final decision about the future legal system of the 
territory does not have to be made. In the case of an end to occupation, the way 
back to the former legal system is also easier. Ultimately, the confusion among the 
population about the applicable law is less. 
Finally, the advantage of the dual nationality has to be mentioned. The inhabitants 
of Crimea will not face a loss of nationality: remaining Ukrainian has the 
advantage that Crimeans can travel or move to the territory of Ukraine without 
facing any limits set by the Ukraine government.
By way of contrast, there are also disadvantages. For the inhabitants it is 
detrimental that in the international community there is disagreement about the 
legal status of the territory and therefore the applicable law. On the one hand, the 
Western community claims the status of occupation and, on the other hand, Russia 
introduces measures into the region, implying that Crimea is a territory of the 
Russian Federation. From this disagreement the inhabitants of Crimea can be 
confused about what kind of law applies to them, what demands they can put 
forward and who can enforce them. The disadvantage of the dual applicable legal 
systems has the same effect. On the one hand, there is the law of occupation and,
on the other, human rights law. This problematic area leads to the danger of legal 
uncertainty. As long as there is legal uncertainty the inhabitants will have 
problems in trusting the applicable law. The problem of legal uncertainty also 
makes it more difficult for the legal authorities to introduce the law to the 
population. 
Another disadvantage of the law of occupation is the different degrees of
protected persons in the HR and GC IV. Because of that, there is no uniform level 
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of protection for all inhabitants. This disadvantage further increases the danger of 
legal uncertainty. In addition, the law of occupation is a limited area of law: the 
rights provided are limited to a minimum of protection and are also a duplication
of what is in the HR and the GC IV. These rights are aimed to secure the physical 
integrity and human dignity of the people living in the occupied territory. And it is 
no wonder that the law of occupation cannot provide for the number of rights and 
enforcement measures in comparison to the entire legal system of a state. 
As the last disadvantage, an increased risk of the potential for conflict can be 
mentioned. The law of occupation is designed to apply only for a certain time – it 
is not intended as a lasting solution. Moreover, one has to consider the different 
ethnic groups living in Crimea. With the certainty that the current situation is
permanent, different groups will start to gain power over territory and position 
themselves for the time when the occupation has ended; such a situation can at
worst lead to civil war.
(b) Interim Conclusion
To come to a conclusion one can state that both alternatives can benefit the 
inhabitants of Crimea, but neither is free from disadvantages. Because the two
areas of law do not have the same purpose, it is obvious that one’s advantage is 
somehow the other’s disadvantage. First, it has to be pointed out that the problem 
of legal uncertainty in the law of occupation does not occur to the same extent in 
the law of state succession. The law of state succession has the advantage that a 
whole functioning legal system applies to the new territory. On the other hand, 
however, the law of occupation attaches importance to continuity, which entails 
less conversion efforts for the inhabitants of Crimea. 
But both areas of law have in common that they inherent conflict potential. 
Although the causes of a possible conflict are to be found in different reasons, in 
both instances they should not be underestimated. Therefore it can be concluded 
that neither of these areas of law is bringing about a major improvement in the 
lives of the inhabitants of Crimea. Both legal systems provide protections but also 
are sources of risk.
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(c) Could be a Hypothetical Application of the Law of State Succession Legally 
Tenable?
After discussing and comparing the law of occupation and the law of state 
succession, in what follows it should be assumed for the purpose of the following 
argument, since both legal areas don’t have major arguments in favour or against 
their application, that the law of state succession is the better one from the 
perspective of the inhabitants. The crucial question in this situation is: To what 
extent can legal arguments be put forward to underpin the proposed assumption? 
or Does the de facto situation override the de jure situation and therefore the 
international community has to apply the law of state succession in Crimea for the 
benefit of the civilian population? 
Reasons for the assumption of a replacement lay in the idea, that the law of 
occupation can secure for a certain amount of time, but can’t provide a satisfying 
solution for all parties for many decades. As a current example the Israel-
Palestine-conflict can be mentioned. Furthermore the law of occupation is 
designed to apply for temporally amount of time, its purpose isn’t to be 
conclusively applicable in a territory. Additionally could a comparison of the two 
legal system and the questioning of the law of occupation, at the end 
strengthening the law of occupation and leading to new developments.
There are several arguments that may support the proposed assumption. As a first 
argument, the fact can be put forward that in the case of a state succession the 
right of self-determination of Crimea’s inhabitants will be fulfilled. Self-
determination includes the right of a population of a territory to freely determine 
its future political status.214 Following World War II it was doubtful whether the 
right was an enforceable part of international law,215 and only during the process 
of decolonisation did the right gain full legal status. In the Case Concerning East 
Timor (East Timor case)216 the ICJ declared it to be an essential principle of 
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international law217 and therefore the principle can now be regarded as a part of 
international law.218
A large number of Crimeans are Russian sympathisers and supported the 
integration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation. In the Russian rebel-
controlled referendum they voted in favour of integration and therefore freely 
expressed their desired future political status. The inhabitants of Crimea can also 
be seen as right-bearers, because they meet the requirements to be seen as one
people. The first requirement is that the people in question must be separate, 
which implies a distinctive history and tradition.219 The Crimeans have a special 
history and also had a special position in the relationship between Ukraine and 
Russia. Furthermore, their common language is Russian and not Ukrainian and 
the inhabitants are therefore a separate group of people. On the other side there is 
also a division recognisable. There is the nationality movement of the Tatars and 
the self-image of the ethnic Russians. But from a democratic perspective, which is 
inherent in the right of self-determination, the results of the referendum reinforced 
the idea that they see themselves as separate. 220 But in connection with this 
argument one has to keep in mind the limitation put forward by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in the Quebec case221 that the right arises only in extreme cases. 
Such cases are former colonies or where people are oppressed and have no access 
to government to pursue their political economic and social rights.222 In other 
cases, apart from those mentioned, states and the UN deny the right and it is
expressly forbidden by the Declaration on Friendly Relations223224 As already 
indicated, in the past the Crimeans neither suffered any oppression nor had the 
status of a colony. On the contrary, Crimea had the status of an autonomous 
republic with its own government. Because the requirements of the right to self-
determination are not fulfilled in the Crimean case, the argument cannot indicate 
that state succession should apply in Crimea.  
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Another legal argument could be that because of the actions taken by Russia and 
its allies and the duration of the occupation up to this point and in estimations, a 
customary law could emerge that regards the peninsula as resorting under the 
perspective of international law. In order to assume such a customary law exists,
the necessary requirements for an international customary law need to be fulfilled. 
The main source of customary international law is the consistent practice of states. 
The fundamental concept is that if states act in a certain consistent way, then they
are acting in such a way because they have a sense of legal obligation – opinio 
iuris.225 If enough states perform in such an equivalent way, because of their 
conviction to being legally obliged for a long period of time, a new rule of 
international customary law is developed.226 In the Crimean case, the question is 
therefore: Is there consensus in the international state community about the 
practice that after an occupation through the use of force and the opinion of the 
occupying power the occupied territory can be incorporated into that state? 
In 1961 India took over the territory of Goa from Portugal by military force. The 
international community protested but no action were put forward by the UN.227
The takeover was excused on the ground that the territory was part of India, which 
was accepted by the international community over the years.228 Because originally 
Crimea was part of Russia, someone could assume a similar case to Goa occurred 
in Crimea.
On the other side Israel occupied the territory of West Bank and Gaza, because it 
considers that these territories belong to the Israelite population. But throughout 
the years and in several court decisions there has been no consensus about the fact 
that these territories are part of Israel. In fact, in the past years the increasing trend 
has been to consider Palestine as a state.229 As an example for such a judgment 
can be mentioned the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The court 
determined that: 
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the de facto annexation of land interferes with the territorial sovereignty and
consequently with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.230
The Russian actions in South Ossetia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014 also cannot
be considered to be consistent state practice that supports such a customary 
international rule. This is because it is merely performed by one state and in the 
case of the South Ossetia, Russia withdrew her military forces and recognised 
South Ossetia as an independent state. 
The example of the Turkish invasion of North Cyprus on 20 July 1974 is another 
instance of this situation, because the territory was not incorporated into Turkey, 
but instead the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared. 
Unfortunately up to now the only state practice in regards to an acceptance of an 
annexation is the Indian invasion on Goa. But after the time of decolonisation 
further state practice in this regard doesn’t exist. Without reasonable and 
consistent state practice the requirements for the development of a customary law 
are not met. There the propound argument can’t support the raised question.
The next argument which may support the question is linked to the problem of 
prolonged occupation. It is a fundamental principle of belligerent occupation that 
the occupying power is vested with temporary power only and holds no 
sovereignty over the territory. But because the authors of the law of occupation 
considered short-term occupation only and not decade-long occupations, it can be 
claimed that the provisions are inadequate for regulating prolonged occupation.231
It is agreed that the duration of occupation calls for special measures in the law of 
occupation.232 Problems occur in connection with art 43 HR, which provides the 
occupant with legislative power in the scope of his or her duty to “restore and 
ensure … public order and civil life”. This competence reaches its limits in 
situations of long-term occupation, because other issues arise and have to be
solved through the law. Because of these problems, it is questionable which law 
should be applicable: At what point of the duration of occupation can the 
occupation be seen as annexation? The probabilities are great that the occupation 
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of Crimea is going to last for a long time and has to be regarded as prolonged. On 
the basis of the occurrence of another prolonged occupation and the problems that 
could lead to, it is more necessary than ever to develop new rules to deal with 
such situations. Because of the symbiosis of prolonged occupation and 
annexation, the rules of state succession could be consulted. 
This argument can be extended even further if we accept that prolonged 
occupation is illegal, because it is not provided for by the rules of IHL. To fill this 
gap it is also necessary to apply the law of state succession. On the other hand, 
some scholars argue that even the law of occupation was designed for short-term 
occupations. IHL sets no time limits for occupation and therefore prolonged 
occupation problems can be solved within the existing IHL rules.233 In this regard,
art 43 HR is indeed a limitation on the legislative competence of the occupant, but 
nonetheless the parameters of this competence are flexible and open to
interpretation.234 Furthermore, the concepts cannot be seen as definite, because the 
notions depend on the actual circumstances.235 To examine, whether the 
occupying power crosses the boundaries of art 43 HR, scholars want to use the 
“litmus test”.236 The basic idea behind the test is the distinction between the 
wellbeing of the local population and whether the occupying power also shows 
similar concern towards the welfare of its own population.237 Therefore, the 
lawfulness of the legislation aimed at improving the situation of the local population 
should be measured against the existence of its equivalent in the territory of the 
occupying state.238 Should similar pieces of legislation not be in force in the 
occupant’s own territory, the measures would be considered not to have been 
introduced effectively for the welfare of the occupied population and therefore
presumed to be unlawful for the purposes of occupation law.239 A further counter-
argument is that it would be contradictory to use the law of state succession in such a 
situation, because it is precisely the purpose of the law of occupation to find an end to 
the ongoing occupation. This purpose cannot be realised if the law of state succession 
applies.
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Russia introduced a nationalisation programme in Crimea, the key point of which was 
the introduction of the Russian passport to the inhabitants of Crimea. Through this 
programme many Crimeans are now Russian and therefore citizens of the occupying 
power. Even if the western community don’t confirm such actions, they have to 
accept the nationalization and since the ICJ judgment in the Nottebohm Case240,
that Russia is exercising right of diplomatic protection. The ICJ demands that 
there must be a 
strong factual tie between the person concerned and one of the states whose 
nationality is involved.241
To determine strong ties different factors has to be considered, such as habitual 
residence of the individual, family ties and participation in public life.242 The 
consequence of being a citizen of the occupying power is the loss of status of a 
“protected person” under the scope of GC IV. Article 4 GC IV defines “protected 
persons” as:
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in 
case of a conflict or occupation, in hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying 
Power of which they are not nationals.
Because of this, GC IV no longer applies to them and this means that the law of 
occupation is only partially applicable. Only the HR does not distinguish between 
the different possible categories of inhabitant. However, the part application of the 
law of occupation is an unsatisfactory result. As an alternative, the law of state 
succession could apply. Because Russia introduced the opportunity to get an 
Russian passport, many Crimeans took this opportunity. As a result Russian law 
applies to them and they are under diplomatic protection of Russia. Though the 
holding of the Russian passport express their ties to Russia. The situations also 
differ, because the inhabitants usually resist assuming the nationality of the 
occupying state. On the other hand, one has to except that a situation or the 
principle that the de jure situation has to evade the de facto situation has not
developed in the field of international law, even if the inhabitants of the vacant 
territory sympathize with the invading power. The principle could have been 
applied in the Israel–Palestine conflict, but even there the law of occupation still 
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applies. Although it can be argued with the Indian invasion of Goa, that the 
international community accepts annexations, the recent cases doesn’t confirm 
such a state practice. The requirements for the development of a new principle in 
international law, which are state practice and opinion iures, are not meet here. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of such a principle would cause immense problems, 
because all over the world states would occupy territory in order to gain new 
territory without having to fear the applicability of the law of occupation. That
would open Pandora’s box and would be contrary to the purpose of international 
law, which is to uphold the security of interstate peace, international security as 
well as the security of the foundations of human existence.243 This purpose cannot
be reached by means of a principle which accepts that the de jure situation has to 
evade the de facto situation.
It can be concluded that there are several legal arguments which support the thesis 
that the law of state succession should apply for the greater good of the 
inhabitants of Crimea. However, these arguments cannot persist on the basis of 
international law.
E Conclusion
Since 2014, the activities in Crimea have affected the conduct of international 
law. In the beginning, considerable discussion took place about the lawfulness of 
the Russian actions. The discussion peaked when the compact between Russia and 
Crimea concerning the integration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation
was put in place. After Russia presented the Western state community with an 
accomplished fact, the focus of international law shifted to the discussion about 
the legal consequences of Russia’s action. 
After introducing Crimea and giving an overview of the events which occurred at 
beginning of 2014, the incidents were analysed from the perspective of the 
international law. It can be asserted that the use of force by Russia was illegal and 
that no grounds for its justification exist. 
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With reference to the referendum, holding a referendum is not prohibited by 
international law; however, it has to be in line with the principles of international 
law and cannot be seen as legal title for a territory change. 
Finally, the integration treaty does not comply with international law. The 
integration has to be seen as annexation and therefore unlawful. It can be 
determined that even effective control by a foreign military force can never by 
itself bring about a valid transfer of sovereignty244 and Crimea is therefore an 
occupied territory. International law covers occupation through the law of 
occupation and the main set of rules in these circumstances are the HR and GC 
IV. 
By way of contrast with the law of occupation, the law of state succession would 
apply if we were to assume that the annexation was legal. From the perspective of 
the inhabitants of Crimea it makes no difference whether the law of occupation or 
the law of state succession applies. But there are no legal arguments that can 
support the assumption that instead of the law of occupation the law of state 
succession should apply. 
Accordingly, the international community has to accept the de jure situation and
has to abide by the rules provided by the law of occupation. But, as we have seen,
the rules are inadequate when the occupation endures for many years. With regard 
to a prolonged occupation, changes to international law are therefore required. 
Furthermore, it appears necessary that both the HR and GC IV should provide the 
inhabitants with the same level of protection. 
Apart from that, one must await further developments in this region. So far no 
new conflicts have occurred here, apart from the ongoing battles in Eastern
Ukraine. As long as that conflict remains unresolved, the potential for conflict 
exists in Crimea. A return to the situation prior to the 2014 action appears 
unrealistic at this point in time because Russia is in a strong position in Crimea, 
and so, from the point of view of international law, Crimea will remain an 
occupied territory for the foreseeable future. Although one can blame international 
law for its inflexibility, it is not necessary, however, for the benefit of the 
inhabitants of Crimea that the law of occupation has to or should evade the law of
succession.
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